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In survey studies, probabilistic expectations about uncertain events are typically elicited by 
asking respondents for their introspective beliefs.  If more complex procedures are feasible, 
beliefs can be elicited by incentive compatible revealed preference mechanisms (“truth 
serums”). Various mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, which differ in the 
degree to which they account for respondents’ deviations from expected value maximization. 
In this paper, we pit non-incentivized introspection against five truth serums, to elicit beliefs 
in a simple two-player game.  We test the internal validity (additivity and predictive power 
for own behavior), and the external validity (predictive power for other players’ behavior, or 
accuracy) of each method. We find no differences among the truth serums. Beliefs from 
incentivized methods are better predictors of subjects’ own behavior compared to 
introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of 
accuracy and additivity.  
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1.  Introduction 
In decisions under uncertainty, information about the probabilities of the various events is 
often unavailable, and decisions have to be made on the basis of subjective probability 
judgments. Agents should form these subjective assessments of likelihoods (beliefs) 
according to the laws of probability, and evaluate alternatives by their belief-weighted 
expected utility (Savage 1954). Because of their importance in economic decisions, 
economists have elicited subjective beliefs in a wide range of applications. Game theorists 
have tested whether subjective beliefs about other players’ behavior can explain deviations 
from Nash equilibrium strategies (e.g. Bellemare, Kroeger & van Soest 2008; Blanco et al. 
2011; Costa-Gomez and Weizsäcker 2008; Rey-Biel 2009). Macroeconomists have studied 
the effect of beliefs about uncertain future income and demand on savings and investment 
decisions (Guiso, Japelli and Terlizzese 1992; Guiso and Parigi 1999). In development 
economics, researchers tried to link beliefs to decisions to adopt new variety of seed or to 
settle in natural disaster prone areas (Cameron and Shah 2011; Delavande, Gine, and 
McKenzie 2011), and health economists investigated whether wrong beliefs can explain risky 
health behaviors such as smoking or shunning of preventive care (Carman and Kooreman 
2010; Ahmed Khwaja, Frank Sloan and Martin Salm, 2006; Khwaja et al. 2007).  Although 
in theorizing it is typically assumed that agents form beliefs rationally, in empirical 
applications they may differ from the true unknown probabilities.  If they differ, it has been 
shown that subjective beliefs are often better predictors of behavior than objective 
likelihoods, even if the latter are available to the researcher.
1  
  Various methods have been employed to elicit beliefs. The most common method 
involves directly asking respondents about their introspective beliefs.  Simple introspective 
questions can easily be included in surveys and are easy to explain to respondents.  On the 
downside, respondents may have little incentive to think carefully about the problem, thus 
adding noise.  More seriously, respondents may misrepresent their beliefs because of social 
desirability, or to influence what they believe is the goal of the research (Li 2007; Manski 
2004; Zizzo 2010). To overcome the problems of simple introspection, methods have been 
developed that extract beliefs from respondents’ revealed preferences between prospects that 
                                                      
1 E.g. Branch (2004) for macroeconomic expectations; Armantier & Treich 2009; Bellemare, Kroeger & van 
Soest 2008; Costa-Gomez & Weizsaecker 2008; Heinemann, Nagel & Ockenfels 2009; Nyarko & Schotter 
2002, for behavior in games; Haruvy, Lahav, & Noussair 2007 for trading in asset markets; Carman & 
Kooreman 2010 for medical decisions; Guiso, Japelli & Terlizzese 1992 for precautionary saving. See also 
Attanasio (2009) and Hurd (2009). 3 
 
offer real monetary payoffs depending on the uncertain event of interest to the researcher.  If 
the monetary incentives dominate other motives, these mechanisms are incentive compatible, 
i.e., reporting true beliefs maximizes the respondent’s belief-weighted expected payoff 
(Hurwicz 1960).  Because it is in the best interest of the respondent to reveal her beliefs 
truthfully, incentive compatible methods have sometimes been called truth serums (Prelec 
2004).  Many truth serums assume that respondents are risk-neutral expected utility 
maximizers.  Because both risk neutrality and expected utility maximization may empirically 
be violated (Machina 1987; Starmer 2000), refinements have been developed that account for 
risk aversion and for non-linear probability weighting (Andersen et al. 2010; Heinemann et al. 
2009; Hossain and Okui 2011; Offerman et al. 2009).     
  Given the importance of measuring people’s subjective expectations in economics and 
other social sciences, an assessment of the costs and benefits of the different methods is 
warranted. While the cost of implementing a method in a specific setting (survey, 
experiment) can usually easily be assessed by the individual researcher, its relative benefits 
are less obvious.  There is little evidence yet on whether the various truth serums improve the 
quality of the elicited beliefs over and above the benchmark of simple introspection, and if 
so, by what degree. Similarly, there is little evidence on whether more complex (and thus 
theoretically more robust) methods yield more reliable data. In many applications it may be 
impossible to condition monetary incentives on an event of interest, because it falls outside 
the period in which the researcher has access to the subjects.  Even in laboratory experiments, 
the researcher may want to avoid complex belief elicitation tasks because they distract 
subjects form the main task of interest (Cabrales et al. 2010; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair 
2007). In these cases it is important to understand potential deviations from true beliefs 
caused by introspective questions or less robust truth serums. 
  The aim of the current paper is to study in a controlled environment whether (1) truth 
serums provide higher quality belief data than simple introspection, and (2) whether more 
complex truth serums are worth the additional effort because they elicit better data than less 
sophisticated truth serums.  In contrast to the previous literature, we consider a large set of 
truth serums, and compare the methods using three different quality criteria. Applications 
may be concerned with different aspects of the subjective beliefs, and differences in the rank-
order of the methods across the three criteria provide information on which methods best 
serve the goal of the researcher. To assess the benefits of different truth serums, the current 
paper pits introspection against five incentive compatible mechanisms of different degree of 4 
 
complexity.
2 In a between-subject design, we compare introspection to three widely used 
truth serums, viz. the outcome matching method (e.g., Kadane and Winkler 1988; Heinemann 
et al. 2009; Huck and Weizsäcker 2002), the probability matching method (e.g., Abdellaoui, 
Vossmann and Weber 2005; Arrow 1951, Hollard, Massoni, and Vergnaud 2010; Holt 2006), 
and the quadratic scoring rule (e.g., Brier 1950; Costa Gomes and Weizsäcker 2008; 
McKelvey and Page 1990; Nyarko and Schotter 2002; Rey-Biel 2009).  Moreover, we 
consider a correction method for outcome matching that controls for deviations from risk 
neutrality under expected utility used by Heinemann et al. (2009), and a correction method 
for the scoring rule that controls for deviations from risk neutrality, caused by either utility 
curvature or probability weighting introduced by Offerman et al. (2009). We elicit players’ 
beliefs in a simple two-person ultimatum game, and measure the internal and external validity 
of each method.  External validity concerns in how far the elicited beliefs match the true 
objective probabilities of the event (accuracy). As a measure of external validity we thus 
study the predictive power of the elicited beliefs for the behavior of the other players in the 
game.  Internal validity concerns “the degree to which persons give internally consistent, 
sensible responses to the questions” (Manski 2004, p. 1343).  As measures of internal validity 
we employ the additivity of the elicited probabilities (Attanasio 2009; Tversky and Koehler 
1994), and the consistency of players’ beliefs with their own behavior in the game (Costa-
Gomez and Weizsäcker 2008; Costa-Gomez et al. 2008).   
  A few studies have directly compared subsets of the widely used methods, employing as 
a quality criterion the external validity (accuracy) of the elicited beliefs. Hoa and Houser 
(2010) compare two implementations of probability matching proposed by Karni (2009). 
Friedman and Massaro (1998), Sonnemans and Offerman (2001), and Rutstrom and Wilcox 
(2009), compare non-incentivized introspection with the quadratic scoring rule. Hollard, 
Massoni, and Vergnaud (2010) include introspection, the quadratic scoring rule and 
probability matching in their study.  Huck and Weizsäcker (2002) compare the quadratic 
scoring rule and outcome matching.  The evidence from this literature is mixed, and shows no 
clear advantage of incentivized methods over introspection. Similarly, no truth serum seems 
to dominate the others in terms of accuracy.  While Huck and Weizsäcker find that the 
scoring rule performs better than outcome matching, in Hollard et al.’s study the scoring rule 
gives worse results than either introspection or probability matching. However, none of these 
                                                      
2 Complexity refers the implementation of the task (number of questions asked, payment mechanism, and 
difficulty of instructions, and randomizations). 5 
 
studies considered corrections for risk attitudes in the scoring rule or outcome matching 
methods. Consequently, deviations from risk neutrality have been brought forward to explain 
poor performance of these truth serums in some studies.  Hossain and Okui (2011) propose a 
new scoring rule method that is insensitive to deviations from expected value maximization, 
and show that it elicits more accurate beliefs than the quadratic scoring rule.  Andersen et al. 
(2010) compare the quadratic and the linear scoring rule, and elicit a large number of risky 
choices alongside the belief questions. They find no differences between the two methods, 
but show that correcting for risk attitudes influences the estimated subjective beliefs.  These 
studies support the view that risk corrections are important in belief elicitation.  
  Building on the existing literature, the current paper studies a larger set of methods, 
including corrections for outcome matching and the scoring rule. The current paper also 
extends previous analyses by using criteria of both external and internal validity to compare 
truth serums and introspection. The existing evidence is completely silent on the comparative 
performance of methods in terms internal validity measures.
3 We compare the empirical 
performance of the different methods, being agnostic about the theoretical validity of each 
method in our current setting and subject pool. We believe that in virtually all empirical 
applications, the researcher has little information about validity of the various assumptions 
underlying the methods (precise risk attitudes, violations of expected utility), and is interested 
only in eliciting high quality data. For example, if a method that does not control for 
incentive compatibility leads to smaller violations of additivity than a method that does 
control for incentive compatibility, we consider the former, theoretically less robust, method 
empirically preferable.           
  The current paper finds little evidence for improved empirical performance of more 
complex methods.  There are no robust differences among the five truth serums for any of the 
three criteria considered. Moreover, the results show that introspective belief measurement 
performs similar in terms of accuracy and additivity as the truth serums. However, 
incentivized beliefs are a better predictor of players’ own behavior in the game. The current 
study thus supports the view that introspection is a valid method to measure subjective beliefs 
in applications where accuracy and additivity are important. If more complex methods are 
                                                      
3 Armantier and Treich (2009) employ  introspection, a scoring rule and a prediction contest in their study of 
beliefs first price auctions. They show that subjective probabilities explain overbidding, and report that the 
elicitation method did not affect their results. Their study thus provides indirect evidence for the equivalence of 
introspection and scoring rule beliefs terms of internal validity.  6 
 
feasible, there can be benefits from using incentive compatible mechanisms to predict agents’ 
behavior. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives definitions and notation.  Section 3 
introduces the belief elicitation methods that are considered in the current study, followed by 
the experimental design in Section 4.  Experimental results are presented in Section 5, and 
discussed in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Definitions and Notation 
We study beliefs in the context of the ultimatum game.  In stage 1 of the game, a proposer 
proposes the division of an amount of €20 between herself and another player, called the 
responder. The proposer chooses from a menu of six possible allocations of the type 
(proposer receives, responder receives), viz. (€20, €0), (€16, €4), (€12, €8), (€8, €12), (€4, 
€16), and (€0, €20).  In stage 2, the responder decides whether to accept or to reject the 
proposal.  If she accepts, the proposal is implemented.  If she rejects, both players receive €0.  
  We elicit full strategies for responders in the ultimatum game.  That is, we let responders 
indicate for each possible proposal whether she accepts it or rejects it.  The game is resolved 
by matching the actual proposal to the respective strategy of the responder.  Before resolving 
the game, we elicit proposers’ beliefs about the rejection/acceptance probabilities for each of 
the six proposals, and elicit responders’ beliefs about the proposal.   
  Let E denote an uncertain event, such as whether the responder accepts the offer (€20, 
€0).  We call an event risky if objective probabilities are exogenously given, i.e., when the 
probability p of event E is known a priori.  In many situations no objective probabilities are 
available to the decision maker.  We call an event uncertain in this case.  In the ultimatum 
game, events based on behavior of the other player are uncertain.   
  In discussions of the theoretical properties of the truth serums, we assume that under 
uncertainty agents form subjective assessments of likelihoods of the uncertain events 
(beliefs), according to the laws of probability. That is, we assume that agents are 
probabilistically sophisticated (Machina and Schmeidler 1992).  Moreover, agents evaluate 
alternatives by the belief-weighted expected utility that each alternative yields (Savage 1954).  
More specifically, let xEy denote a prospect that yields outcome x if event E obtains and 
outcome y if E
c obtains, with E
c the complementary event not-E, and x and y designating 
monetary amounts in Euro.  Under expected utility, the prospect is evaluated by B(E)U(x) + 
B(E
c)U(y), where B(E) denotes the subjective belief in event E, U is a continuous and strictly 7 
 
increasing utility function, and B(E
c) = 1 – B(E).  We call the prospect xE0 a bet on event E, 
paying x if E obtains and zero otherwise.  The certainty equivalent (CE) of a prospect is the 
certain amount that makes the agent indifferent between receiving the prospect or receiving 
the certain amount.  The matching probability p of event E is defined by the indifference 
between a prospect paying x if event E obtains (and nothing otherwise), and a prospect 
paying x with probability p (and nothing otherwise), i.e., xE0 ~ xp0.    
3.  Introspection, Truth Serums, and the Cost of Implementation  
This study measures beliefs in a simple ultimatum game with a restricted choice set, eliciting 
full strategies. This allows us to observe incentivized beliefs for strategies that are rarely 
implemented in actual play. We employ four methods to elicit beliefs of proposers and 
responders in the ultimatum game in a between subject design (introspection plus three truth 
serums).  After applying corrections for risk attitudes to two of the methods, we obtain in total 
6 different measurements of beliefs, which we describe in section 3.1. In section 3.2 we 
illustrate the differences in the cost of implementing each method, which underly the need to 
provide empirical estimates of the benefits of each method, to make an informed tradeoff 
between costs and benefits. 
 
3.1. Measuring Beliefs: The Elicitation Methods 
Introspection. In the introspection task each proposer was asked to state her beliefs 
concerning the rejection behavior of the responder in an introspective way.  For each of the 
six proposals, proposers stated the probability that the allocation would be rejected by the 
responder by reporting a number between 0 and 100.  Similarly, responders were asked to 
report for each proposal the probability that it was chosen by the proposer.  Subjects received 
a fixed payment of €5 for this task.
4  
 
Outcome Matching.  With outcome matching, beliefs were inferred from indifference 
between a sure amount of money and the prospect xEy, i.e, 
   CE  ~  xEy   (1) 
                                                      
4 Details of the payment procedures for all methods are given in the experimental design section.  8 
 
for some amounts x > y (e.g., Kadane and Winkler 1988, Heinemann et al. 2009). Under the 
assumption of expected value maximization it follows from the equality CE = B(E)x + 
(1B(E))y  that the belief B(E) is equal to (CE–y)/(x–y). In the experiment, for each of the six 
proposals, we presented proposers with 21 choices between a prospect that pays €15 if the 
proposal was accepted (event E) and zero otherwise, and some sure amount. The larger the 
subjective probability of acceptance, the more attractive the prospect becomes. The sure 
amount varied between €0 and €15 in equally sized steps, and the 21 choices were presented 
in a choice list (see appendix). For low sure amounts the prospect is commonly chosen, while 
for large sure amounts the sure amount is commonly preferred. The midpoint between the 
values for which the subject switched between a preference for the prospect to a preference 
for the sure amount is taken as the certainty equivalent from which the subjective belief can 
be calculated.  Similarly, for responders, for each proposal, a prospect paying €15 if the 
proposal was chosen by the proposer and zero otherwise was compared to 21 sure amounts in 
a choice list as described above.  Again, the larger the subjective probability that the proposer 
accepts the proposal, the more attractive the prospect becomes, and the larger the elicited 
certainty equivalent should be.  
 
Probability matching. In the probability matching task, we elicited for each subject the 
probability p that satisfies the indifference 
   xpy  ~  xEy   (2) 
for some  x > y.  Under a general expectation function with w(p) transforming (subjective) 
probabilities and U(x) transforming outcomes, w(B(E))U(x) + (1-w(B(E)))U(y) = w(p)U(x)+ 
(1-w(p)U(y) implies B(E) = p.
5 Thus, probability matching is valid under a wide range of 
decision models, including expected utility, rank-dependent utility, and prospect theory.   
Probability matching was commonly used in early decision analysis (Raiffa 1968, §5.3; Yates 
1990 pp. 25-27).  More recent empirical measurements of beliefs through probability 
matching can be found in Holt (2006, Ch. 30), and in Abdellaoui, Vossman, and Weber 
(2005).  In the experiment we incentivized probability matching by using choice lists for both 
players and for each allocation as discussed for outcome matching above (see appendix).  
                                                      
5 From w(B(E))U(x)+(1-w(B(E)))U(y)=w(p)U(x)+(1-w(p)U(y) it follows that w(B(E))=w(p). The conclusion 
that B(E)=p thus hinges on the assumption that both subjective and objective probabilities are transformed 
equally (Wakker 2004).  9 
 
Now, the choice lists involved choices between a prospect based on the decision of the other 
player (event E), and a prospect with a given probability p of winning the €15. There were 
again 21 choices in each list, with probability p ranging from 0 to 1 in equally-sized steps of 
.05. Probabilities were presented in terms of frequencies using a 20-sided die.   
  
Quadratic scoring rule. Beliefs can be measured through so-called scoring rules, introduced 
by Brier (1950) and de Finetti (1962), which have the advantage that a single choice suffices 
to determine the exact belief in an incentive compatible way.  Scoring rules have been used in 
many domains, including education (Echternacht 1972), finance (Shiller, Kon-Ya, and 
Tsutsui 1996), political science (Tetlock 2005), and experimental game theory (Costa Gomes 
and Weizsaecker 2008). The most popular scoring rule is the quadratic scoring rule (QSR; 
McKelvey and Page 1990, Nyarko and Schotter 2002).  When rewarded according to the 
quadratic scoring rule, the agent is offered the prospect 
   [a   b(1  r)
2] E[ a  br
2],   (3) 
with a>0 and b > 0. The parameter r  [0, 1] is chosen by the agent. A clairvoyant who 
knows that event E will obtain chooses r = 1 to maximize her payoff; a clairvoyant who 
knows that event E will not obtain chooses r = 0. A decision maker who is uncertain about 
the event E chooses r = B(E) to maximize her expected payoff.
6    
  In the experiment, beliefs were elicited with the quadratic scoring rule by presenting 
subjects with a table that calculates for each of 21 values of r, r{0, .05, ..., .95, 1}, the 
payoff under event E and under its complement E
c according to Eq.3 (see appendix).  The 
parameters were set to a=€20 and b=€20, implying a symmetric payoff structure and a risk 
free payoff of €15 resulting from r=.5.  Subjects chose one row in the table, rather than 
directly reporting their subjective probabilities, and received a payoff depending on which 
event materialized.  Thus, for a proposer who believes that the proposal (€0; €20) is very 
likely to be accepted, it will be attractive to choose a row that yields a larger payoff under the 
event “proposal accepted” than under its complement.  Note that subjects were not told that 
truthful reporting of their belief maximizes their expected payoff, or any related claim 
referring to truthful revelation being in their best interest.  Although a similar list format was 
                                                      
6 This follows immediately from the first order condition of expected value maximization with respect to r, 
2bB(E)(1r) = 2br(1B(E)).  10 
 
used as in the outcome and probability matching methods, in the scoring rule task 
respondents made only a single decision.  
 
Corrections for risk attitude. It is easy to see that in contrast to the probability matching 
method, the outcome matching method and the scoring rule are not incentive compatible if 
the respondent is not risk neutral. In the case of the scoring rule, for example, choosing r=.5 
perfectly hedges the agent. If the agent is risk averse, the perfectly hedged prospect may be 
preferred over a risky one deriving from her true belief. Because risk attitude is typically 
found to deviate from risk neutrality, we consider refinements of these two methods that 
account for these deviations. 
  For the quadratic scoring rule we used the refinement proposed by Offerman et al. (2009) 
that corrects reported beliefs for risk aversion caused by utility curvature and non-linear 
probability weighting.
7  The method involves eliciting subjects’ parameter r for risky events 
with known probability (e.g. a dice roll in our experiment). If the objective probability equals 
p, a deviation away from r = p indicates that the respondent hedges due to risk aversion.
8 
Offerman et al. (2009, sec. 11.4.) show that beliefs can be corrected by fitting the non-linear 
function p = r+r
2 (called the correction function) at the individual level using a set of 
objective probabilities p and the corresponding values of r reported by the subject. This yields 
estimated parameters * and *. Under uncertainty, the corrected beliefs then follow from the 
rE, reported for the uncertain event E of interest, as B(E) = *rE+*(rE)
2.  
  For outcome matching, under expected utility with utility function U(x) the elicited 
belief equals B(E) = (U(CE) – U(y))/(U(x) – U(y)) (e.g. Heinemann et al. 2009). Hence, for 
concave utility the ratio between numerator and denominator becomes larger compared to 
risk neutrality.  Uncorrected beliefs would thus be biased downwards under risk aversion.  
We measured the utility function from a risky decision task and corrected reported beliefs for 
utility curvature in outcome matching.   
 
3.2. Cost of Implementation 
We have argued that more theoretical robustness comes at higher implementation costs, 
which suggests a tradeoff between cost and potential empirical benefits. In Table 1 we 
                                                      
7 Kothiyal et al. (2011) generalize the correction techniques introduced by Offerman et al. (2009), and discuss 
methods to increase incentives for beliefs close to r=.5.  
8 Some deviations would obviously indicate risk seeking, but this is less common and poses no problems for the 
correction method. 11 
 
summarize the implementation cost for the six measurement methods. Clearly, the truth 
serums require more effortful elicitation than simply asking subjects to report their belief. 
Moreover, theoretically more robust methods add additional costs in the form of multiple 
scoring rule tables, additional randomizations, or additional lottery choices. These 
implementation tools require more time and additional instructions, and potentially require 
more trust from the subjects if randomizations to play lotteries and to select 
choices/tables/choice lists are not easily observable by the subjects. The latter is often the 
case in computerized surveys and experiments.  
 
      TABLE 1: Implementing Truth Serums Experimentally 
  Cost of implementation per event   Theoretical benefit: 
Valid under 
Introspection  1 verbal question  - 
Outcome Matching  1 choice list of 21 choices  EV 
Probability Matching  1 choice list of 21 choices; 1 random-
ization with known probabilities 
EV, EU, RDU, PT 
Quadratic Scoring Rule  1 table of 1 choice  EV 
Outcome Matching 
(corrected) 
1 choice list of 21 choices; plus 1 risky 
choice question (once) 
EV, EU 
Quadratic Scoring Rule 
(corrected) 
1 table of 1 choice; plus 10 tables of 1 
choice each (once)  
EV, EU, RDU, PT 
Notes: EV=expected value; EU=expected utility maximizations; RDU=Rank-dependent 
utility; PT=prospect theory maximization  
 
4.  Experimental Design 
General Procedures. Two-hundred-six undergraduate students from a wide range of 
disciplines participated in a computerized experiment that was conducted in the Tilburg 
University CentERlab.
9 The experiment had three stages. In stage 1, subjects played an 
ultimatum game using a full strategy method. The game was not resolved until the end of the 
experiment.  Proposers’ and responders’ beliefs about the other player’s behavior in the game 
were elicited in Stage 2. Stage 3 measured risk attitudes by a simple lottery choice task. For 
subjects in the scoring rule treatment, the third stage also elicited the parameters used for the 
                                                      
9 The experiment used the z-Tree package by Fischbacher (2007). 12 
 
correction method discussed in section 3. Subjects were given written instructions before 
each stage.
10   
  No games, lotteries or belief-elicitation bets were resolved until the end of the 
experiment.  After all decisions had been made by the subjects, one stage and one decision 
within this stage were randomly selected for each participant for real payment. This was done 
to prevent hedging and wealth effects (Starmer and Sugden 1991; Thaler and Johnson 1990; 
Blanco et al. 2010). The decisions were resolved and paid in private, and all randomizations 
for lotteries were done by throwing dice.   
 
Stages and Treatments. The first stage was identical for all subjects.  They were randomly 
assigned the role of either proposer or responder in the ultimatum game, and made their 
proposal or rejection/acceptance decisions as described in Section 2.  The ultimatum game 
has been employed as a baseline task here because it provides a natural tension between the 
game theoretic prediction and fairness-related intuitions.  All non-zero proposals should be 
accepted and thus the smallest non-zero amount been proposed for the responder if both 
players care only about monetary payoffs.  Fairness considerations by either player will lead 
to deviations from this prediction.  Because no player knows whether the other person 
considers such fairness issues in her choices, there is strategic uncertainty and beliefs become 
non-trivial.  For proposers, the beliefs are an important input to their decision: given a belief 
that low proposals are rejected with high probability, even a proposer maximizing her 
expected monetary payoff (and thus not concerned with fairness) will offer a positive amount 
to the responder (Manski 2004, Bellemare et al. 2008). 
  The second stage belief measurement was implemented as a 4-treatment between-subject 
design. The treatments measured introspection (N=52), outcome matching (N=52), 
probability matching (N=50), and scoring rule (N=52) beliefs. Details of the different 
methods are discussed in section 3.  For proposers we elicited beliefs about acceptance 
probabilities for each of the six proposals.
11  For responders, we elicited for each proposal the 
probability that it was chosen by the proposer.  We additionally elicited for proposers their 
beliefs about the rejection probability for the proposal (€12, €8).  We expected this proposal 
to yield subjective probabilities of both acceptance and rejection that were clearly bounded 
away from zero or one.  For responders, we additionally elicited the probability that the 
                                                      
10 Instructions and screen shots for different treatments can be found in the appendix. 
11The six proposals of the type (proposer receives, responder receives) were (€20, €0), (€16, €4), (€12, €8), (€8, 
€12), (€4, €16), and (€0, €20). See Section 2 for details.  13 
 
proposal (€12, €8) was not chosen by the proposer.  These questions came after the questions 
regarding the acceptance (for proposers) and “was-chosen” (for responders) probabilities.   
For the proposal (€12, €8) we therefore obtained the subjective probability of the event E that 
the proposal was accepted/chosen, and the subjective probability of its complement E
c 
(proposal was rejected/not chosen).  This allows us to study the additivity of the subjective 
beliefs, i.e. whether these belief measures add up to exactly 100%.  Moreover, for responders 
we also study additivity of the choice probabilities over all six proposals.  
  The third stage of the experiment measured individual utility functions to control for 
deviations from risk neutrality; all subjects did the same task.  The certainty equivalent of the 
prospect 100.50 was elicited by a simple choice list.  For subjects in the scoring rule treatment, 
this stage contained an additional task.  For these subjects we elicited scoring rule parameters 
r for 10 objectively known probabilities as described in section 3.  This allows us to correct 
reported scoring rule beliefs for nonlinear risk attitude.  
5.   Results  
This section presents the experimental results, and assesses the internal validity (do reported 
beliefs adhere to the laws of probability; do choices reflect subjective beliefs) and external 
validity (do reported beliefs successfully predict other players’ behavior) of the elicitation 
methods used in the experiment.  We first give the results of the ultimatum game and the 
utility estimation and risk attitude correction.   
 
Ultimatum game.  The probability that each allocation was chosen by the proposers, and the 
acceptance probabilities of responders for each allocation in the ultimatum game are given in 
Table 2.  These probabilities serve as a benchmark for the analyses of the subjective beliefs 
below.  
      TABLE 2: Choice and Acceptance Probabilities Ultimatum Game  
 
 Allocation 
  (€20, €0)  (€16, €4)  (€12, €8)  (€8, €12)  (€4, €16)  (€0, €20) 
Choice 
probability  5.88% 19.61%  65.69% 6.86%  1.96%  0.00% 
Acceptance 
probability  13.73% 43.14% 90.20% 95.10% 92.16% 88.24% 14 
 
  As typically found, proposers send positive amounts to responders with the modal 
proposal close to the equal split.  On average, proposers send about 36% (€7.18) of the pie to 
responders, which is consistent with earlier findings (e.g. Roth 1995, chapter 4; Oosterbeek et 
al. 2004).  Although positive offers in the ultimatum game can be interpreted in terms of 
social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 2003), they can also derive from expected payoff 
maximization if the proposer believes that low offers are rejected (Manski 2004, Bellemare et 
al. 2008).  Below we study if beliefs predict choices even in the absence of a social 
preference specification.  
  Responders’ acceptance probabilities also showed a typical pattern by increasing from 
about 14% for the lowest offers to above 90% for proposals around the equal split. 
Acceptance was then decreasing slightly to 88.24% when the complete pie was offered to the 
responder.  Thus, some responders accepted intermediate offers, but rejected low and high 
offers.  This behavior has been found before, and can be explained by moral concerns of 
responders (e.g., Bellemare et al. 2008; Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2008).  
 
Risk Attitudes and Corrections.  In total, twelve subjects switched multiple times between the 
option yielding a certain amount of money and the option yielding the prospect 100.50.  These 
observations were excluded from the analysis.  The average certainty equivalent of the 
prospect 100.50 was €4.56.  In total, 70.62% percent of subjects were risk averse, which is in 
line with what is commonly found in studies on individual decision making.  For the 
parametric specification we assume the power utility function, U(x) = x
, where 1- is the 
coefficient of constant of relative risk aversion (CRRA), and =1 indicates risk neutrality.  
The average (median)   in our sample is .978 (.931), which is significantly smaller than 1 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = ; p<.01). The elicited certainty equivalents in the 
outcome matching treatment were corrected for curvature of the utility function at the 
individual level using these CRRA estimates.  
  Reported beliefs in the scoring rule treatment were corrected for non-linear risk attitudes 
using the elicited correction function as discussed in section 3.  Risk corrections do not make 
sense for respondents who are not responsive to objective probabilities, and we excluded 6 
subjects for whom the correlation between objective probability and scoring rule parameter r 
was very low.
12 In Appendix C we give the results of the risk correction choices which 
                                                      
12 Excluded subjects had correlations of zero (4 times), .13, and .20. The lowest correlation of included subjects 
was .71.  15 
 
confirm that subjects’ reported probabilities deviate from the objective known probabilities. 
The data also suggest that most deviations from the known probability were due to risk 
attitude and not pure noise. For both high and low probabilities, subjects are biased toward 
the .5 probability, but not beyond the .5 probability. For instance, for objective probability .8 
we observed implied reported probabilities in the range .5 to .8, but virtually no such reported 
probabilities below .5.  Thus, there seems to be little purely random choice, which would 
imply such a pattern (i.e., reported beliefs on the “other side” of the .5 probability).  
 
Internal Validity of the Elicited Beliefs.  As described in Section 4, for the proposal (€12, €8) 
we elicited both rejection and acceptance beliefs from proposers, and choice and not-choice 
beliefs from responders.  Because the events are complements, their subjective probabilities 
should add up to 100 percent.  This allows us to assess the internal validity of the different 
methods by testing whether elicited beliefs are additive.  For responders we can also test 
whether the predicted choice probabilities over all 6 proposals add up to 100%.    
 
TABLE 3: Additivity 
Notes: Entries medians (means) of the sum of the reported probabilities; */** significantly larger than 100% 
based on a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, 5%/1% significance level.  
 
  The first row of Table 3 gives medians and means of the sum of proposers’ reported 
probabilities of the event “(€12, €8) accepted” and its complement. There is a clear additivity 
bias, with the sum of the subjective probabilities significantly larger than 100% for all 
methods except the corrected scoring rule. Given the size of the deviations for the corrected 
scoring rule, however, this insignificance appears to be caused by larger variation rather than 
better additivity properties. The second row present results for the sum of the responders’ 
reported probabilities of the event “(€12, €8) chosen” and its complement.  Results are closer 




















































to additivity, and deviations are insignificant for all truth serums.
13  The last row shows 
additivity of the responders’ expected choice probabilities for all six proposals.  We find that 
all deviations are large and significant, and that introspection performs significantly better 
than the quadratic scoring rule (Mann-Whitney-U test, z=2.255, p<.05) for the case of 
responders’ beliefs over the 6 proposals. For this case, the correction of the quadratic scoring 
rule for deviations from risk neutrality improves additivity (Wilcoxon test, z=3.412, p<.01), 
replicating the finding in Offerman et al. (2009). We do not observe any other significant 
differences among the truth serums. The results show that elicited beliefs suffer from 
significant non-additivity, with the implied probabilities of the unions of events being too 
large. With 6 events considered, violations of additivity are more pronounced than for 2 
events only. Overall there is little evidence of more complex methods outperforming simpler 
methods; in particular, introspection does not consistently underperform compared to the 
truth serums. 
  The second measure of internal validity concerns the consistency of proposers’ beliefs 
with their own choices in the ultimatum game (Costa-Gomez and Weizsäcker 2008, Rey-Biel 
2009).  We calculate proposers’ optimal choices in the game under the assumption that they 
maximize (1) expected value, (2) expected utility with CRRA utility function, or (3) a Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) social preference utility function that considers differences in payoffs among 
the agents. The social preference function is parameterized using estimates in Bellemare et al. 
(2008) for all subjects. Results are in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4:  Percentage of Proposers’ Choices Consistent with Reported Beliefs 
Note: Numbers are percentages. EV=Expected value maximization; EU= Expected utility maximization, 
FS=Fehr-Schmidt expected social preference function maximization; FS parameterized with =0.85 and β= 
0.32; EU is based on individual CRRA estimates. */** indicates significant better prediction than random at 
5%/1% significance level. 
 
  Table 4 shows that the truth serums predict around 30-40% of the choices, which is 
significantly better than chance in most cases. Surprisingly, the performance is only mildly 
                                                      
















EV  66** 19 32* 32*  31*  28 35* 
EU 64**  17  28  30*  32*  32*  45** 
FS  66** 19  28 36**  35*  24 35* 17 
 
affected by the utility function employed. Introspection performs poorly on this measure of 
consistency, with predictions correct in less than 20% of the cases. We do not find significant 
differences in performance among the truth serums. The table also includes predictions using 
the actual acceptance probabilities as shown in Table 2. We observe that in the current setting 
the objective probabilities (observed frequencies) predict behavior much better than the 
subjective beliefs. While objective probabilities are not available in many settings, the results 
show that subjective probabilities elicited by introspection may not improve predictions in 
comparison to simple random choice. The truth serums perform better, but still cannot 
account for much of the variation in actual behavior. The numbers are similar to the findings 
in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), while Rey-Biel (2009) finds higher rates of best-
response to stated beliefs. Armantier and Treich (2009) find clear evidence that subjective 
probabilities are better predictors than objective probabilities in a first price auction 
experiment. 
  In sum, the internal validity of the subjective beliefs is affected little by the complexity 
of the elicitation method. Truth serums perform better in predicting own choices than 
introspection. On the other hand, they can lead to even larger deviations from additivity than 
introspection does. Directly providing a probability estimate may help participants to adhere 
to the basic additivity principles, compared to the revealed preference measures in which 
probabilities are not explicitly specified. We find evidence that correcting for nonlinear risk 
attitudes improves the additivity of beliefs elicited by the QSR.  
 
External Validity of the Elicited Beliefs.  The third quality criterion that we employ concerns 
the external validity of the elicited beliefs. We assess the consistency of the beliefs with the 
actual observed choice/acceptance probabilities.  Table 5 shows the observed acceptance 
frequencies of responders for each proposal, as well as the reported beliefs of the proposers in 
the different treatments. The subjective probabilities of the proposers appear to be 
systematically distorted towards uniform beliefs in almost all treatments.  That is, for 
proposals that are rarely accepted, proposers are too optimistic; for proposals that are likely to 
be accepted, proposers are too pessimistic. A similar pattern in reported beliefs was found by 
Costa-Gomez and Weizsäcker (2008) and Bellemare et al. (2009), and is consistent with 
conservatism in reported beliefs (Edwards 1954).  It is also consistent with the tendency for 
agents to overweight low probabilities and underweight large probabilities, i.e., with an 18 
 
inverse-S shaped probability weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Carman and 
Kooreman 2010).  
  Table 5 also shows the effect of the correction methods for the QSR and outcome 
matching. For the QSR, risk aversion biases reported beliefs toward uniformity as discussed 
in section 3. The correction leads to significantly less uniformity (comparison column 6 and 
8, p<.05, Wilcoxon test). For outcome matching, concave utility leads to a downward bias in 
reported beliefs.
14  Comparison of columns 4 and 7 of Table 5 shows that correction increases 
the beliefs (p<.05, Wilcoxon test). However, the uniformity bias remains strong for corrected 
outcome matching.  
 
TABLE 5: Observed Acceptance Frequencies versus Proposer’s Beliefs 
Notes: Numbers are percentages; */**/*** denotes significant different from observed frequencies based on a 
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test at the 10%/5%/1% Level. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
    As a measure of accuracy of reported beliefs, we calculate mean Brier scores, the 
average squared deviation between the actual choice frequencies and the reported beliefs, for 
each of the six allocations over all proposers (Costa-Gomez and Weizsaecker 2008). Lower 
scores indicate higher levels of accuracy. Results are in Table 6. All methods perform better 
than a random prediction derived from uniform distribution between 0 and 100.
15 Among the 
                                                      
14 In B(E)=(CE-y)/(x-y), for concave utility, the difference x-y is overestimated compared to U(x) – U(y) more 
strongly than the difference CE-y is overestimated compared to U(CE)-U(y).  
15 Scores for random prediction calculated as  
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different elicitation methods, however, there are no systematic differences. In particular, 
introspective beliefs are as accurate as incentivized beliefs.  
 
TABLE 6: Mean Brier Score of Reported Beliefs by Proposers 
Notes: Lower scores represent higher levels of accuracy. a: for each event the belief is calculated as the 
random prediction from a uniform distribution *: significantly different form random prediction at the 5% 
significance level, Mann-Whitney U test 
 
  For responders, Table 7 and 8 show the results of the analogous analyses. There is 
conservatism in the beliefs with a tendency toward uniform beliefs. The correction methods 
affect beliefs in the same direction as discussed above for proposers. Regarding the accuracy, 
there are no significant differences in the mean Brier scores between any of the methods, with 
all mean scores very similar. All methods improve accuracy compared to the benchmark of 
random predictions. 
  Interestingly, although the correction for the QSR reduces the risk aversion bias and 
increases average accuracy for all events (Table 5 and 7), variances of the corrected beliefs, 
and also brier scores, go up. In Appendix C we have shown that for known probabilities, 
subjects are biased toward probability .5, but not beyond the middle of the table. For 
unknown probabilities, however, subjects may be less well calibrated, holding beliefs lower 
than .5 for an event that occurs with a probability above .5 for instance. In this situation, 
correction for risk aversion will further move the corrected beliefs away from the objective 
probabilities, reducing accuracy. That is, eliminating the risk aversion bias in QSR beliefs 





















(€20, €0)  .219  0.205  0.177  0.141  0.138  0.176  0.151 
(€16, €4)  .089  0.098  0.089  0.046  0.033  0.076  0.057 
(€12, €8)  .241  0.096  0.115  0.121  0.080  0.091  0.084 
(€8, €12)  .282  0.052  0.100  0.116  0.094  0.081  0.089 
(€4, €16)  .257  0.035  0.098  0.086  0.070  0.079  0.052 
(€0, €20)  .226  0.033  0.128  0.115  0.066  0.106  0.073 
Mean 0.219 0.087* 0.118* 0.104*  0.080*  0.102* 0.084* 20 
 
       TABLE 7: Observed Choice Frequencies versus Responder’s Beliefs 
Notes: Numbers are percentages; ***/**/* denotes significant different from observed frequencies based on a 




      TABLE 8: Mean Brier Score of Reported Beliefs by Responders 
Notes: Lower scores represent higher levels of accuracy. a: for each event the belief is calculated as the 
random prediction from a uniform distribution *: significantly different form random prediction at the 5% 
significance level, Mann-Whitney U test. 
 
6.   Discussion  
This paper compares the performance of introspective belief measurement to five incentive 
compatible elicitation methods, or truth serums, of different degree of complexity. More 








































































































(€20, €0)  0.282  0.196  0.094  0.167  0.163  0.122  0.144 
(€16, €4)  0.179  0.160  0.066  0.113  0.181  0.085  0.152 
(€12, €8)  0.106  0.095  0.061  0.091  0.033  0.059  0.040 
(€8, €12)  0.274  0.168  0.123  0.102  0.146  0.150  0.113 
(€4, €16)  0.319  0.063  0.111  0.042  0.113  0.132  0.074 
(€0, €20)  0.338  0.002  0.106  0.096  0.054  0.131  0.050 
Mean 0.250  0.114*  0.093* 0.102*  0.115* 0.113*  0.096* 21 
 
or decision analyses. A researcher who is constrained in terms of time, number of questions 
asked, or funds for monetary incentives therefore needs to make an informed trade-off 
between the cost and the benefits of complexity. The current study includes three widely used 
truth serums, and two corrected methods that account for deviations from risk neutrality. 
Importantly, we consider a larger range of quality criteria to rank methods than previous 
studies did. We test both the internal validity (additivity, prediction of own behavior), and the 
external validity (accuracy of other players’ behavior) of the elicited beliefs. Our findings 
suggest that there is no clear benefit from using more complex methods. First, there are 
virtually no differences in the performance of the truth serums for any of the quality criteria. 
Second, comparison of the incentivized methods with simple introspection does not reveal a 
clear advantage for the truth serums.  
  Accuracy. In terms of accuracy of the beliefs, the introspective method provides equally 
good predictions as the incentive compatible methods. All methods generally perform better 
than random prediction. The evidence regarding the accuracy of introspective versus 
incentivized beliefs is mixed in the literature (Friedman and Massaro 1998;  Hollard et al. 
2010; Sonnemans and Offerman 2001; Rutstroem and Wilcox 2009). The current data 
support the view that there are no clear differences in accuracy between introspection and 
incentivized methods.  
  A potential explanation for the observed differences in the literature lies in the presence 
or absence of an underlying social decision task. Non-incentivized methods may be affected 
by misrepresentation of beliefs, in contrast to simple lack of effort and increased noise due to 
the lack of incentives. Beliefs in social settings may be more prone to, possibly unconscious, 
justification and accountability pressures (Vieider 2011; Vieider and Tetlock 2010; Zizzo 
2010).  Indeed, studies that elicited beliefs about events in individual decision tasks found no 
evidence of a bias in introspective beliefs (Friedman and Massaro 1998; Hollard et al. 2010; 
Sonnemans and Offerman 2001), while Rutstroem and Wilcox (2009) report worse 
performance of introspection than the QSR in a task based on the prediction of another 
player’s behavior. The current study involved beliefs in an ultimatum game―a strategic 
setting that has often been associated with justification and strategic misrepresentation of 
attitudes and beliefs―and finds similar accuracy among incentivized and non-incentivized 
methods. Thus, intentional misrepresentation does not seem to be a omnipresent problem in 
belief elicitation in social settings.  22 
 
  A few studies have pointed out that uncorrected outcome matching and scoring rule 
methods are not incentive compatible in the presence of deviations from risk neutrality, and 
may thus fail to elicit true beliefs (Andersen et al. 2010; Heineman et al. 2009; Hollard et al. 
2010; Hao and Houser 2010, Offerman et al 2009; Sonnemans and Offerman 2001). We find 
evidence for deviations caused by deviations from risk neutrality, and find that the methods 
proposed to correct these methods work in the intended direction: for outcome matching, the 
downward bias is reduced, and for the QSR the bias toward uniform beliefs is reduced by 
using corrected measures. However, these corrections did not lead to an overall significantly 
increased accuracy of beliefs.  
  Predicting behavior. In predicting proposers’ own choices from their beliefs, truth 
serums improve on random prediction while introspection does not. This holds true for 
different specifications of the (social) utility function. The predictive power of all methods is 
at best modest, however, and objective probabilities clearly outperform subjective beliefs. 
Our results are consistent with the previous findings of modest internal validity of subjective 
beliefs (Costa-Gomes and Weizsaecker 2008), although the poor performance of 
introspection in predicting choice behavior is somewhat surprising. There is evidence 
showing that non-incentivized introspective beliefs predict behavior in many settings 
(Bosman and van Winden 2002; Carman and Kooreman 2010; Guiso et al. 1992; Guiso and 
Parigi 1999). However, the link between subjective probabilities and behavior might be 
weaker in strategic interaction task compared to individual decisions. In the current setting, 
unobserved social preferences that are not properly modeled by the expected (social) utility 
function may play an important role in the decision process. For instance, the favorable 
allocations (€4, €16) and especially (€0, €20) are rejected by roughly 10% of the responders. 
Such behavior cannot be explained by the models that we considered. It is therefore 
conceivable that in situations that do not involve strong social aspects, e.g. the medical 
decisions studied in Carman and Kooreman (2010) or the financial decisions studied by 
Guiso et al (1992) and Guiso and Parigi (1999), the predictive power of subjective beliefs is 
higher than in the current task. 
  Additivity. Violations of additivity have often been observed for subjective beliefs, and 
Tversky and Koehler (1994) offer a psychological account of such violations. Consistent with 
their theory, we find that violations of additivity are more severe for 6 events compared to 2 
events. Tversky and Koehler (1994) conjecture that non-additivity may be a problem 23 
 
particularly related to introspective beliefs.
16 However, Offermann et al. (2009) find non-
additivity for the QSR and the corrected QSR. The current paper shows that non-additivity is 
strong for all five truth serums, and that introspection sometimes outperforms incentive 
compatible methods. Correcting the scoring rule beliefs for risk attitudes reduces deviations 
from additivity, but the absolute level of deviation from additivity remains large.  
7.   Conclusion  
Subjective beliefs are an important input in many economic policy and management 
decisions, ranging from expectations about macroeconomic variables to individual 
epidemiological risk factors in medical decisions. The most commonly used method to elicit 
subjective beliefs outside experimental settings and decision analyses involves the simple 
reporting of introspective beliefs (Delavande 2011, Hurd 2009). The reason for the popularity 
of the non-incentivized introspective method lies in its simplicity and the potential difficulty 
of implementing incentive compatible payments on survey panels and for events that are 
unobservable during the time frame of the study. In experiments, simple methods are often 
preferred because they potentially distract subjects from the main task of interest (Cabrales et 
al 2010; Haruvy et al. 2007). Our study compared simple introspection to five incentive 
compatible belief elicitation methods of different complexity, where more complexity implies 
theoretically more robust methods. We compare the different methods in a controlled setting 
with uncertain events with probabilities unknown to the subjects, but observable by the 
researcher. That allows us to study both internal and external validity in an environment of 
natural uncertainty. We found little evidence for improved performance of more complex 
truth serums. Moreover, the results show that introspective beliefs measurement performs 
similar in terms of accuracy and additivity as the incentivized methods. This finding supports 
the view that introspection is a valid method to measure subjective beliefs in many 
applications. However, incentivized beliefs are a better predictor of players’ own behavior in 
the game. Incentivized methods may also reduce the risk of participants knowingly or 
unknowingly misrepresenting their beliefs. On balance, thus, our findings imply that if 
complexity is feasible, like in laboratory experiments or expert decision analysis, researchers 
can benefit from using more complex and incentivized methods. For many purposes, 
however, introspection will serve the researcher just as well.   
                                                      
16 See also Attanasio (2009). 24 
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Appendix (not for publication; will be made available online) 
A Example Instructions  
This appendix provides the instructions for the ultimatum game task and for the different 
belief elicitation methods (between-subject). We give for each method instructions for either 
the responder or the proposer. Screenshots of the choice lists are given in appendix B. In the 
experiment, instructions were given on the left hand side of the screen, while decision forms 
and choice lists were given on the right hand side of the screen.   
  
Ultimatum game task, general 
In this experiment, participants are randomly assigned the role of proposer or responder. In the first period,
17 
proposers are asked to divide €20 between themselves and a responder,  by choosing 1 of the 6 possible 
allocations depicted in the table below:  
 
At the same time, responders are asked whether they would accept or reject each of the 6 possible allocations. 
At the end of the experiment, each proposer is randomly matched with a responder. The earnings of proposers 
and responders in the first period are determined by whether or not the responder accepted the allocation chosen 
by the proposer.  
If the responder accepted the allocation chosen by the proposer, the €20 is divided between the proposer and the 
responder in accordance with the chosen allocation. If the responder rejected the allocation chosen by the 
proposer, the earnings of the responder and proposer in the first period are equal to €0. 
 
Ultimatum game task, proposer 
You are a proposer. On the right, you are asked to choose an allocation by typing in a number from 1 till 6. At 
the end of the experiment, the computer will select one period at random to be paid for real. If the computer then 
selects period 1, your earnings are determined as follows. First, you will be randomly matched with a responder. 
This responder was asked to accept or reject each of the 6 possible allocations in period 1. If the responder that 
is matched to you rejected the allocation you have chosen in period 1, you and the responder will receive €0. If 
                                                      
17 In the experiment we used the term period instead of stage. Each decision screen was a period, that is, there 
were more periods than stages as defined in the design section because stage 2 contained 7 different belief 
questions.  
  Allocation 1  Allocation 2  Allocation 3  Allocation 4  Allocation 5  Allocation 6 
Proposer  €20  €16  €12  €8 €6 €4 
Responder €0  €4  €8  €12  €16  €20 30 
 
the responder that is matched to you accepted the allocation you have chosen in period 1, the €20 will be divided 
between you and the responder in accordance with the allocation chosen by you.  
For instance, if the computer selected period 1 to be paid for real, you chose Allocation 4 in period 1, and the 
responder matched to you accepted Allocation 4 in period 1, you will get €8. In this case, the responder matched 
to you will get €12. 
Please choose an allocation by typing in a number from 1 till 6 on the right side of the screen. 
 
Ultimatum game task, responder 
You are a responder. On the right, you are asked to reject or accept each of the 6 possible allocations. At the end 
of the experiment, the computer will one period at random to be paid for real. If the computer then selects period 
1, your earnings are determined as follows. First, you will be randomly matched with a proposer. This proposer 
was asked to choose 1 of the 6 possible allocations in Period 1. If you have rejected the allocation chosen by the 
proposer in period 1, you and the proposer matched to you will receive nothing. If you have accepted the 
allocation chosen by the proposer in Period 1, the € 20 will be divided between you and the proposer in 
accordance with the allocation chosen by the proposer.  
For instance, if the computer selected period 1 to be paid for real, the proposer matched to you chose Allocation 
4 in Period 1, and you accepted Allocation 4 in period 1, you will get €12. In this case, the responder matched to 
you will get €8. 
Please reject or accept each of the 6 possible allocations, by ticking the "reject" or "accept" button for each 
allocation on the right side of the screen.   
 
Belief task, proposer, introspection  
You are a proposer. At the end of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with a responder. This 
responder was asked to accept or  reject each of the 6 possible allocations in period 1. 
On the right, we ask you to report the probability that you think that the responder matched to you accepted 
Allocation 1 in period 1. We ask you to report this probability in percentages, ranging from 0% to 100%. For 
example, if you are completely sure the responder matched to you at the end of the experiment accepted 
Allocation 1 in period 1, you should report a probability of 100%. If you are not sure whether the responder 
matched to you accepted Allocation 1, you should report a probability between 0% and 100%.   
At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one period  at random to be paid for real. If the computer 
then selects period 2, your earnings are €5. 
 
Belief task, proposer, probability matching  
You are a proposer. At the end of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with a responder. This 
responder was asked to accept or reject each of the 6 possible allocations in period 1. 
On the right, you see a list of choices between options labeled Option A, and Option B. In each choice, Option 





       Asset  [asset  number]    
If the responder matched to you accepted allocation [alloc. number]:   €15 
If the responder matched to you rejected allocation [alloc. number]:   €0   
 
 
Thus, Asset [asset number] yields €15 if the responder matched to you at the end of the experiment accepted 
Allocation [alloc. number] in the first period.  If the responder matched to you at the end of the experiment 
rejected Allocation [alloc. number] in the first period, Asset [asset number] yields €0. 
In each choice, Option B yields an amount of money depending on the roll of a 20-sided die. To determine the 
amount of money that Option B yields, a 20-sided die will be rolled at the end of the experiment. For instance, 
Option B in Choice 4 yields €15 if the roll with the 20-sided die is 1, 2, or 3.  Otherwise, Option B in Choice 4 
yields €0. 
Now please take a look at Choice 1 in the list of choices on the right. We imagine that most people would 
choose Option A in Choice 1, since Option A then gives a chance of an amount higher than zero, whereas 
Option B gives €0 for sure. Similarly, we imagine that most people would choose Option B in Choice 21, since 
Option B then gives €15 for sure, whereas Option A only gives a chance of €15. Hence, we imagine that most 
people would switch from choosing Option A to Option B at some point in the list.  
You are asked to make 21 choices between Option A and Option B by ticking the box corresponding with the 
option you prefer. Although we imagine that most people would switch from Option A to Option B at some 
point in the list, it is entirely up to you what to do in each of the choices. At the end of the experiment, the 
computer will select one period  at random to be paid for real. If the computer then selects period [current 
period], your earnings are determined as follows.   
First, you will be randomly matched with a responder, and the computer will select 1 of the 21 choices at 
random. The option you have chosen in that choice will then be paid out for real, depending on the roll of the 
20-sided die (if you have chosen Option B) or the decision made by the responder matched to you (if you have 
chosen Option A). Thus, each of your choices could eventually be the one that determines the payment you 
receive.  
 
Belief task, responder, outcome matching 
You are a responder. At the end of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with a proposer. This 
proposer was asked to choose 1 of the 6 possible allocations in period 1. On the right, you see a list of choices 
between options labeled Option A, and Option B. In each choice, Option A yields Asset [asset number], 
depicted below:  
       Asset  [asset  number]    
If the responder matched to you did choose allocation [alloc. number]:      €15 
If the responder matched to you did not choose allocation [alloc. number]:  €0   
 
Thus, Asset [asset number] yields €15 if the proposer matched to you did choose Allocation [alloc. number] in 
the first period. If the proposer matched to you did not choose Allocation [alloc. number] in the first period, 
Asset [asset number] yields €0. In each choice, Option B yields a certain amount of money.  32 
 
Now please take a look at Choice 1 in the list of choices on the right. We imagine that most people would 
choose Option A in Choice 1, since Option A then gives a chance of an amount higher than €0, whereas Option 
B gives €0 for sure. Similarly, we imagine that most people would choose Option B in Choice 21, since Option 
B then gives €15 for sure, whereas Option A only gives a chance of €15. Hence, we imagine that most people 
would switch from choosing Option A to Option B at some point in the list. You are asked to make 21 choices 
between Option A and Option B by ticking the box corresponding with the option you prefer. Although we 
imagine that most people would switch from Option A to Option B at some point in the list, it is entirely up to 
you what to do in each of the choices. At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one period  at 
random to be paid for real. If the computer then selects period [current period], your earnings are determined as 
follows. First, you will be randomly matched with a proposer, and the computer will select 1 of the 21 choices at 
random. The option you have chosen in that choice will then be paid out for real, depending on the decision 
made by the proposer matched to you in case you have chosen Option A in that choice.  Thus, each of your 
choices could prove to be the one that determines the payment you receive.  
 
Belief task, responder, QSR 
 
You are a responder. At the end of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with a proposer. This 
proposer was asked to choose one of the six possible allocations in period 1. 
On the right, you see a Decision Table with 21 numbered rows.
18 Each row yields an amount of euros, 
depending on whether the proposer matched to you did or did not chose Allocation 1 in the first period. The 
amount of euros that each row yields if the proposer matched to you did choose Allocation 1 is shown in the 
second column of the Decision Table. The amount of euro that each row yields if the proposer matched to you 
did not choose Allocation 1 is shown in the third column of the Decision Table.   
For instance, if the responder matched to you at the end of the experiment did choose Allocation 1 in the first 
period, Row 5 yields €7.20. If the responder matched to you at the end of the experiment did not choose 
Allocation 1 in the first period, Row 5 yields €19.20. 
You are asked to choose a row by typing in the number of the row of your choice in the box below the Decision 
Table. At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one of the periods at random to be paid for real. If 
Period [current period] then is selected, you will receive the amount of euro corresponding to the row that you 
have chosen, depending on whether the proposer matched to you did or did not choose Allocation 1. Thus, each 
of your choices could prove to be the one that determines the payment you receive. 
 
Risk aversion task 
On the right, you see a list of choices between options labeled Option A and Option B. In each choice, Option A 
yields Asset [asset number], depicted below:  
Asset [asset number] 
 if roll of 20-sided die is 1-10:   €10 
if roll of 20-sided die is 11-20:   €0 
                                                      
18 See screen shot example in Appendix B. 33 
 
 
Thus, Asset [asset number] yields €10 if the roll of a 20-sided die is 1 till 10 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10). If the 
roll of a 20-sided die is 11 till 20 (11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20), Asset [asset number] yields €0. To 
determine the amount of money that Asset [asset number] yields, a 20-sided die will be rolled at the end of the 
experiment. In each choice, Option B yields a certain amount of money. 
Now please take a look at Choice 1 in the list of choices on the right. We imagine that most people would 
choose Option A in Choice 1, since Option A then gives a chance of an amount higher than €0, whereas Option 
B gives €0 for sure. Similarly, we imagine that most people would choose Option B in Choice 21, since Option 
B then gives €10 for sure, whereas Option A only gives a chance of €10. Hence, we imagine that most people 
would switch from choosing Option A to Option B at some point in the list.  
You are asked to make 21 choices between Option A and Option B by ticking the box corresponding with the 
option you prefer. Although we imagine that most people would switch from Option A to Option B at some 
point in the list, it is entirely up to you what to do in each of the choices.   
At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one period at random to be paid for real. If the computer 
then selects period [current period], your earnings are determined as follows. First, the computer will select 1 of 
the 21 choices at random. The option you have chosen in that choice will then be paid out for real, depending on 
the roll of the 20-sided die in case you have chosen Option A in that choice. Thus, each of your choices could 




















B Example Screen Shots 




























C Risk Correction of Scoring Rule Beliefs 
Figure C1 illustrates the effect of risk attitude on beliefs elicited by the uncorrected QSR. The 
figure plots the median reported probabilities, implied by the scoring rule choices, against the 
true probabilities of the known risks. All deviations bias the reported beliefs toward .5. All 
deviations are significantly different than the true probability except for p=.5 (two-sided 
Wilcoxon tests).   
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